Punishing war-crimes and human rights violations

A peace that is premised on a general amnesty offering impunity for war-time crimes is not a stable one (MFA 2005). The Lebanese civil war included a long list of gross human-rights violations and brutal massacres of Christians, Muslims and Palestinian civilians (Fisk 1992). Yet, there was neither any criminal investigation of these violations nor were any of those responsible brought to trial. Instead, the Lebanese government passed the General Amnesty Law in 1991 (Law 94/91) which granted amnesty for all crimes committed by militias and armed groups before 28 March 1991.[19] The law effectively stopped legal action against war crimes and war criminals and opened for militia leaders to assume minister posts and for their militias to be turned into parties. Because of this, the General Amnesty Law has been described as a “disaster”:[20] it prevented the country from confronting its war-time record, punish human-rights violations and bringing those responsible to trial. Instead, the amnesty law worked on a selective basis, rewarding those who were favoured by Syria and punished those who fell out with the regime.

A striking example of the failings of the Amnesty Law is the post-war political career of Elias Hobeika, the former leader of the Lebanese Forces’ (LF) security agency. In 1982 Hobeika ordered LF-militiamen into the Palestinian refugee camps Sabra and Shatila leading to the massacre of more than 800 residents.[21] Despite his war-time record Hobeika was twice elected to parliament and from 1991 to 1998 held several ministerial posts (Gambill and Endrawos 2002).[22] In the years to follow, Hobeika’s political career faltered and in 2000 his war-time record was exposed as part of the attempt to indict Israel’s prime minister Ariel Sharon for his role in the Sabra and Shatila massacres. Hobeika publicly denied involvement in the killings and announced that he was willing to testify before the Belgian High Court on his role in the massacre.[23] This never happened as Hobeika was killed near his home by a remote controlled car bomb in late January 2002. The investigation into the killing led to nowhere and joined the long list of unsolved political assassinations in Lebanon. 

In stark contrast to the failure to try Elias Hobeika, Samir Geagea, the leader of the Lebanese Forces (LF), the largest Maronite militia, was imprisoned for life and the LF outlawed. Geagea’s trial is instructive as it shows the selective justice used to persecute war-related crimes in Lebanon. Geagea supported the Taif Agreement believing it would put an end to the war and the LF-militia disarmed and demobilised its soldiers and dismantled its war-time organisation to become a political party by the May 1991 deadline. In late January 1994, a bomb exploded in a village church near Beirut (Our Lady of Deliverance Church at Zouk Mikhael) killing ten people. Despite condemning this incident, Geagea and the LF were singled out as the culprits and shortly afterwards the Lebanese cabinet lifted the General Amnesty Law, ordered the arrest of Geagea and dissolved the LF. Geagea was arrested in mid-April and in 1995 tried for his involvement in the church bombing. He was found innocent of the bombing charge but sentenced to four death sentences, later commuted to life sentences, for several murder accounts (ibid.).[24] Geagea remains the only war-time leader tried for crimes committed during the war. The case against Geagea and his subsequent imprisonment has been condemned by Amnesty International (AI 2004) and underlines the judiciary’s subservience to the government and the cabinet (Takiedde ine 2004). Apart from Geagea, only two other war-time leaders have been indicted: former general Michel Aoun, until recently in exile in France, charged with mutiny and embezzlement of public funds and Etienne Sacre, leader of the right-wing nationalist movement Guardian of the Cedars, who has been sentenced to death in absentia . It is telling that both Aoun and Sacre, the most vocal critics of the Syrian occupation, have been indicted but not those favouring Syrian suzerainty of Lebanon.

The Syrian withdrawal which was completed on 26 May (ahead of the UN Security Council deadline of 30 April 2005), made Samir Geagea’s fate again assume centre stage as did calls for his release (Daily Star 05/05/05b). All the major Lebanese factions and parties have supported Geagea’s release, except the family of former premier Omar Karami, whose brother, former PM Rashid Karami was assassinated in an attack blamed on Samir Geagea. On 18 July, the Lebanese parliament overwhelmingly approved an amnesty bill that secured Geagea’s release from prison (Daily Star 19/07/05). A few months earlier, a similar volte-face by the Lebanese judiciary dropped all charges (which included treason) against the former general Michel Aoun (Daily Star 05/05/05a) and made it possible for him to return to Lebanon on 7 May after a fourteen year exile in France. It is likely that the General Amnesty Law of 1991 will be also amended (Daily Star 27/04/05). One solution that has been tabled is to extend the period of the general amnesty to cover the whole post­ war period before 14 February 2005 so as not to exonerate those implicated in the murder of Rafiq Hariri. The current law only provides amnesty to Lebanese citizens and excludes non-citizens such as the Palestinian refugees. In early May, Lebanon’s Fateh commander (Brigadier) Sultan Abu al-Aynayn requested that the General Amnesty Law should be amended to encompass both Lebanese and Palestinians (Daily Star 10/05/05).[25]

Palestinian refugees

The responsibility to ensure a “sustainable return” of refugees is often at odds with the disinclination of post-war states to host refugees (Chimni 2002). Lebanon’s Palestinian refugee problem predates the civil war and was compounded by the Palestinian militias’ role in the conflict (Haddad 2003). Since their forced exile from Palestine more than fifty years ago, the majority of the refugees (and their descendants) have been living in squalid shelters and cramped refugee camps. The about 350,000 Palestinian refugees in Lebanon now form a disenfranchised minority, suffering from economic marginalisation and fearing being excluded from future peace settlements, which would leave them exiled in Lebanon. Unlike other Arab countries such as Jordan and Syria, which also serve as hosts to Palestinian refugees, Lebanon did not grant the Palestinians civic rights and only a few were granted work permits. Currently, Lebanon has the highest percentage of camp-dwelling refugees (55.4 per cent) of all the countries hosting Palestinian refugees. In recent years the Lebanese government has removed refugee privileges.

The most extreme measure used to discriminate against Palestinians is preventing them from holding jobs and seeking higher education. Palestinians are barred from entering more than seventy high and low status professions so that they come to form a permanent underclass. The most comprehensive study of present living conditions among camp-dwelling Palestinian refugees to date finds that the refugees suffer from widespread unemployment, poor living conditions, ill health, low education levels and rising illiteracy (Ugland 2003). Because of progressive social marginalisation and political disfranchisement, there has been a rise of Islamist sentiments among sections of the refugee community (Knudsen in press) Blamed for igniting the civil war in 1975, the Palestinian refugees’ relationship with the Lebanese state and its citizens has since been strained. In recent years the boundaries of all the camps have been more closely demarcated and are subject to stricter security measures. In addition, the camps themselves have come under scrutiny and been branded “security islands” (Ar. juzur amniyya, “islands of [self-policed] security”), a euphemism meaning that they are beyond the reach of Lebanese law, harbouring weapons and sheltering criminals and assassins (Suleiman 1999: p. 72). Lebanon’s many confessional communities tend to disagree over political issues but they are in agreement that Palestinian refugees should not be “naturalised”, locally referred to as “implantation” (Ar. tawteen) (Azar and Mullet 2002). The rejection of permanent resettlement in Lebanon was also inscribed into the Taif Agreement which states that “there shall be no fragmentation, no partition, and no repatriation [of Palestinians in Lebanon]” (Taif Agreement Online: section I, h). Nonetheless, the Palestinian refugees have received continued backing from Hizbollah which has supported their claim to civic rights and funds social programmes in the refugee camps.[26] Recently, the Labour and Agriculture Minister Trad Hamade, a Christian named by Hizbollah for this post, announced that Palestinians born in Lebanon will be allowed to work in the majority of professions (Daily Star 28/06/05).

The political upheaval following the assassination of former prime minister Rafiq Hariri and the subsequent Syrian withdrawal has changed the traditional power constellations inside the refugee camps which traditionally has been under Syrian control (Knudsen in press). Responding to the new situation, steps have been taken to resolve the power struggle inside the largest refugee camps and improve the security situation.[27] The Palestinian’s right to bear arms ended when the Lebanese government unilaterally abrogated the Cairo Agreement in 1987, but neither war-time nor post-war governments enforced the arms’ embargo.[28] The UN Security Council Resolution 1559 has increased the pressure on Hizbollah and the Palestinian refugees to hand in their weapons and for Hizbollah to complete the transition to a political party. Both Hizbollah and the Palestinian refugees have rejected the call for disarmament and joined forces in preventing the resolution from being enforced (Daily Star 25/04/05).

Reconciliation and remembrance

The importance of post-war reconciliation has long been recognised and studies suggest that a low-cost “forgiveness” approach works best in post civil war situations (Long and Brecke 2003). The Lebanese civil war “came to an end in a state of nearly universal defeat and bitterness” (Picard 2002: p. 153). Yet, there was no post-war reconciliation process, truth commissions, public apologetics or other forms of public conciliation processes. Thus “missing in the transition from war to peace was national reconciliation” (el Khazen 2003b: p. 59).[29] The main reason why national (and grassroots) reconciliation was never on the agenda was due to the Syrians which did not want the Lebanese factions to reconcile, seeking to manipulate them for political ends in its quest for control over Lebanon.[30] When the civil war ended, it was hoped that the Taif Agreement itself would redress war time divisions and end sectarian animosity. An ongoing study from an urban quarter in Beirut finds that people are not finished with the war and harbour feelings of anger and mistrust against neighbours belonging to other sects but that these sentiments are closely guarded and private.[31] This example illustrates that the slogan “no victor, no vanquished”, which has been used to imply that post-war divisions were neither deep nor profound are incorrect.

Even 15 years after the civil war ended, it remains a sensitive and contested topic and requests for instituting a national day for commemorating the war have been rejected. Likewise, attempts at staging commemorative events on 13 April, the day of the outbreak of the war, have been banned (Daily Star 14/04/05). There has also been a neglect of the fate of those missing and presumed dead and whose fate has only recently been highlighted in public protests from relatives and families. This lack of concern for the recent past has also shaped the plans for rebuilding Beirut’s central district which has attempted to deny the country’s war-time record (Nagel 2002). Instead, the reconstruction of Beirut’s Central District has either focussed on recovering the city’s distant archaeological heritage, which can be appropriated by Muslims and Christians alike, or bury the war-time record and replace it with a futuristic, glitzy “Hong Kong of the Middle East” version that interprets the future while leaving the past unexamined (Khalaf and Khoury 1993).

It is understandable that Lebanon’s civil war heritage was so complex, convoluted and contested that agreeing on an “official version” was impossible. This also explains why the country has no public memorials, no national museums and why the restoration of the Martyrs’ Square has not yet been attempted. The centre of Beirut which used to be a no-man’s land between the warring factions is the country’s most sensitive public space. Thus, the Martyrs’ Square has remained an open void in the heart of the capital.[32] A testimony to the Martyrs’ Square national importance is the fact it was chosen as the burial site for Rafiq Hariri next to an imposing mosque he himself funded. The square also became the locus for the youthful crowd that set up camp there following Hariri’s death demanding a Syrian withdrawal. The Martyrs’ Square was also the site for the Cedar Revolution and the public outcry against Hariri’s murder which unleashed a public mourning of a scale not previously seen in Lebanon. However, the outpouring of grief and call for national unity could not subdue the country’s sectarian and political divisions as shown by the anti-Syrian and pro-Syrian rallies that gripped Beirut in the weeks following Hariri’s demise. 

The civil war changed Lebanon’s social geography and reversed the social heterogeneity (mixed confessional residence in villages and cities) that had been growing during the decades leading up to outbreak of the war in 1975. After the civil war many of the former heterogeneous areas had in reality become uni-confessional (Nasr 2003: p. 148ff). One of the best examples of this is Mount Lebanon (Shouf, Aley and upper Metn) which had a mixed pre-war population of Druze (45 per cent) and Christians (55 per cent). By the 1989, the percentage of Christians in Mount Lebanon had dropped to 5 per cent. The reason for this demographic change was the failure to return those internally displaced by the bloody Shouf war (1983) between Druze and Christians.

The Taif Agreement explicitly called for fully resolving the plight of the internally displaced persons (IDPs).[33] However, a sign of the absence of national reconciliation is the failure to return the about 500,000 IDPs to their place of origin (Global IDP Project 2004).[34] The majority of the IDPs are the 300,000 Christians who fled during the Shouf war. Just after the war there were early attempts at grassroots reconciliation between former adversaries, but they were quickly stopped by the Syrian regime.[35] Later, renewed attempts at community-based and grassroots reconciliation efforts were dismal and there was little tangible results from them, suggesting that “grassroots reconciliation does not work”.[36] In August 2001 the Maronite Patriarch Boutros Sfeir visited the Shouf and met the PSP leader Walid Jumblatt. At the conclusion of their meeting, Boutros Sfeir and Jumblatt announced the end of the communal conflict between the Druze and the Maronites.[37] The public reconciliation between the two communities was seen as a significant threat to Syrian hegemony in Lebanon and shortly after there was a massive crackdown on the anti-Syrian opposition parties (Gambill 2001b). The actions of the Lebanese authorities were widely interpreted as a Syrian engineered coup d’etat against national reconciliation.

This could be one reason why the formal reconciliation between Sfeir and Jumblatt did not lead to a return of the Shouf IDPs (Picard 2002: p. 168). Even by 1998, only about 15 per cent of the internally displaced had returned to their homes. The “Ministry of the Displaced” which was created in 1992 with Walid Jumblatt as the first minister spent about US$ 500 million from the Central Fund for the Displaced (CFD) in the Shouf (Picard 2002: p. 167). The funds were disproportionally used to aid the Druze and not the Christians that accounted for about 75 per cent of the IDPs (Gambill 2003a). Until today, the majority of the Christians have not returned to the Shouf. It has been estimated that returning all the IDPs to their place of origin will cost an estimated US$ 122 million (Global IDP Project 2004).

Disarmament and demobilisation

The process of disarmament, demobilization, and reintegration (DDR) of former combatants plays a critical role in transitions from war to peace. The success or failure of this endeavour directly affectsthe long-term peacebuilding prospects for any post-conflict society (Knight and …zerdem 2004). The Taif Agreement led to renewed fighting between the largest militia, the Lebanese Forces (LF) and the interim prime minister general Michel Aoun commanding the Lebanese army (Atlas and Licklider 1999). By the end of 1990 the fighting ended, and a new government was formed in early 1991. By the 30 April 1991 deadline, twenty-four militias organising about 50,000 fighters disarmed following a general amnesty and offering militia leaders governmental posts (Picard 1999). A major factor for the rapid disarmament was the overwhelming presence of the Syrian army which filled the resulting power vacuum. It has been estimated that only one out of thirty Lebanese had been a permanent militia member (ibid.: p. 29). This means that the total number of fighters associated with major militias was not more 30,000 with an additional 15,000 fighters associated with minor militias (Makdisi and Sadaka 2002). The militias’ finances were a combination of protection rackets, looting and robberies, taxation and trading in drugs and contraband that together has been estimated at about US$ 15 billion during the war years.[38]

The purpose of the post-war DDR-process was to forge national reconciliation, social reconstruction and re-establish the authority of the state (Picard 1999). The DDR-process targeted communal and local militias as well as militias linked to political parties but excluded the Palestinian militias, Hizbollah and the South Lebanese Army (SLA).[39] The militias were supposed to “hand in their heavy weaponry, and to close their military headquarters, barracks and training centres” (ibid.: p. 7). A stipulated 6,000 militiamen would be integrated in the first phase of the process and the cost of the entire operation was set at US$ 500,000. The extent to which the militias complied with the decree, their willingness to decommission and dispose of their weapons varied, as did their ability to reintegrate ex-combatants. Initially, all the militias sought to have many more ex-soldiers integrated into the new Lebanese Army than it could possibly absorb and at the same time keep the confessional balance between Christians and Muslims. When the first (and only) phase of the reintegration process was completed in October 1993, about 6,000 ex-militiamen had been integrated into the army.
The Druze militia under the leadership of the Progressive Socialist Party (PSP) surrendered most of their heavy weaponry to Syria and sold the remaining to Yugoslavian fighters. Of a total 3,300 ex-militiamen put up for integration, about 1,300 were integrated with the Lebanese Army. An additional 1,200 PSP militiamen were either provided jobs in the Gulf countries or reintegrated into private business in the Shouf, testifying to strength of the traditional clientelistic networks. The Amal militia closely abided by the DDR-process, and gave up its heavy weaponry to Syria. An important reason for this was the Amal militia’s disintegration into local groups and losses and defections following its destructive war with its rival Hizbollah during the last phase of the civil war. This made Amal announce its dissolution months prior to the government’s deadline for disarmament. Thus, Amal disposed of their heavy weaponry by handing them over to the Syrian army and the ex-Amal officers joined the new Lebanese Army. Many ex-militiamen also joined the civil service, found jobs in the Council for the Development of the South or the local administration in the southern districts with a Shia majority. The insertion of ex-militiamen into the civilian sector was made possible with Amal’s strong ties to the state and the role of the leader, Nabih Berri, who as speaker of the post-war parliament turned Amal into a “powerful clientelist machine with a direct hold of the state” (ibid.: p. 15).[40]

In stark contrast to Amal’s DDR-process, the Lebanese Forces’ (LF) integration into the army was a total failure. This was a reflection of the LF’s weakness following the internal conflict between those accepting the Taif Agreement (Samir Geagea) and those that didn’t (General Michel Aoun). The LF disposed of their large arsenal of heavy weapons by selling it to foreign countries and warlords, repatriated some it to Israel and stowed the remainder in selected sites and strongholds. The LF wanted a large number of its militiamen (8,600) and officers (650) to be integrated with the new Army preferably as distinct army units. However, only a fraction of them were accepted. This meant that the great majority of the militiamen were neither integrated in the Army, nor in civilian positions and thus did not benefit from an amnesty under the General Amnesty Law. Their remaining option was to emigrate and many left the country. An important reason for the failure to integrate the LF-soldiers was the political marginalisation of Samir Geagea who fell out with Syrian leaders controlling the country. The incomplete demobilisation of the LF thus was a result of the LF’s failure to integrate with the new (Syrian controlled) political system.

Conclusion

This paper finds the reasons for Lebanon’s precarious attempts at rebuilding the country from war and implementing a peacebuilding agenda must be sought internally in the country’s inability to confront its war-time past, regionally in its subservience to Syria and its international isolation in the post-cold war period. The start of the Lebanese post-war period (1990–2005) coincided with the launching of “peacebuilding” as an international agenda for peace in 1992. However, there was never an international peacebuilding strategy for Lebanon and the country was left to fend for itself having lost its pre-war strategic importance. This partly explains why Lebanon’s post-war period violates many of the criteria for ending violent conflict and rebuilding war-thorn countries (Cousens, Kumar, and Wermester 2001; Keating and Knight 2004). It also explains the international community’s tacit acceptance of the Syrian tutelage of Lebanon for most of the post-war period. Unable to undertake comprehensive social, economic and political reforms, the country has deflected rather than tackled social problems, displaced rather than resolved communal conflict and disguised rather than dissolved sectarian animosities. Taken together, this explains why Lebanon’s fragile peace is under pressure from many of the same forces that are believed to have triggered the war in the first place: poverty, sectarianism and political confessionalism. The fact that there has been no return to large scale violence should not be interpreted as proof that war-time divisions have been healed. Instead, the country’s sectarian divisions still run deep and can be manipulated for political gain.

The Taif Agreement was meant to facilitate post-war reconciliation, yet a number of the proposed reforms were not implemented and others were violated. Nonetheless, the Taif Agreement still serves as the country’s constitution and remains the cornerstone of the post-war period. The Taif Agreement did not lead to fundamental political reform and the confessional political system remained in essence unchanged although the confessional balance was adjusted to accommodate the country’s Muslim majority. Even though the Taif Agreement ended the civil war, the political conflict continued.

In post-war Lebanon there were neither social reforms nor attempts to reverse regional and social disparities which have continued to grow in the decade since the civil war ended. Poerty and social exclusion have increased and wiped out the middle class and hurt the country’s Muslim majority. While rapid economic growth is considered an important, even a necessary condition for a peace treaty to hold, Lebanon’s economy out is lagging behind. Aid to post-war countries is nowadays considered vital for supporting reconstruction and building peace. Despite the devastation produced by the war, Lebanon’s post-war economic recovery was financed with foreign loans and the country received minimal aid in the form of grants. The Lebanese government’s borrow-to-build strategy left the country heavily indebted and the country’s stagnant economy is now burdened by a huge debt and pervasive corruption. Nonetheless, the country’s post-war economic recovery helped fortify the peace and reduce tensions between warring groups.

Lebanese politics still revolve around politicians rather than parties and tend cater for sectarian groups rather than broader national goals. Due to the importance of pragmatic coalitions in the form of electoral lists whose main function is to secure seats for individual candidates, political parties remain subservient to personal ambition and sectarian interests. Hizbollah is the country’s only modern party but have stayed outside all post-war governments. Having made its mark as a resistance movement, Hizbollah continues to oppose calls for its disarmament.

The Lebanese post-war elections were neither free nor transparent but characterised by extensive pre-election manipulation, vote rigging and Syrian interference. The 2005 elections where free and transparent but not fair due to the combined electoral law and confessional system which served to marginalise minorities and increase the Christian population’s sense of disenfranchisement. 

Because of the General Amnesty Law, the Lebanese authorities did not undertake a comprehensive review of war-time violations but offered a carte blanche amnesty to all war-crimes committed during the civil war. In one case, the authorities engaged in a selective judicial trial against one militia leader, Samir Geagea, for crimes committed during the period covered by the General Amnesty Law. No other cases against war-time violations have been opened probably because this would have doomed the post-war peace efforts since 1990. The implication of this is that Lebanon has never attempted to confront its war-time past and been more concerned about forgetting the war than in remembering it.

The failure to try war-time violations also extends to the failure to investigate the many political assassinations that remains an ingrained part of the country’s political culture and testifies to the weakness of the country’s judiciary and its subservience to the political agenda of the ruling elite and that of Syria. Lebanon amply demonstrates that post-war societies are not necessarily beyond conflict, and political violence continued as did the UN-peacekeeping along the country’s southern border. Whereas the post-war period has seen the “return of the bomb”, the country’s democracy weathered Hariri’s assassination and the Cedar Revolution remained peaceful.

The post-war period saw incipient reconciliation between community leaders but national reconciliation was blocked by Syria and Lebanon has yet to confront its war-time past. There has been little progress in returning IDPs to their place of origin, mostly due to lack of money and political will. In recent months there have been unprecedented advances in national reconciliation between former adversaries in an attempt to forge electoral alliances and election lists. The freeing of Samir Geagea and Michel Aoun’s return from exile can likewise been interpreted as important contributions to ending war-time divisions.

The post-war period has seen anti-Palestinian sentiments grow among the Lebanese citizens and their situation has become progressively more tenacious. The denial of “civic rights” to the refugees is a human rights violation that is tacitly accepted because naturalising the refugees would upstage the sectarian system and offset the balance between Christians and Muslims. The Palestinian refugees’ right to bear arms have been abolished but not enforced and disarming the Palestinian factions as part of the UN Security Council resolution 1559 will also need to resolve Hizbollah’s rejection of disarmament.

The post-war DDR process was undertaken under Syrian tutelage and involved some, but not all, of the war-time factions. The success of the DDR process varied, ranging from compliance (Druze militias) to rejection (LF). The relative success of the DDR process was linked to the General Amnesty Law which turned war-time leaders into political leaders and enabled officers and soldiers’ integration into the Lebanese army. Syria’s presence aided in the rapid demobilisation and disarmament of all but one of the Lebanese militias; Hizbollah, but the Syrian presence later turned into liability and continued occupation.

The Pax Syriana came at very high price for Lebanon and the country became a Syrian client state and was economically, politically and militarily subservient to its larger neighbour. Thus, the Taif Agreement not only heralded the end of the war but also the end of Lebanon as a sovereign country. Regional developments (such as the war in Iraq) allowed Syrian stewardship to reach unprecedented levels and penetrate all social and political fields. Despite withdrawing its forces and dismantling the intelligence apparatus, Syria has crafted an inner colonisation of Lebanon that provides the country with a formidable political and economic leverage with whoever governs the country. This, in turn, means that the withdrawal of Syrian troops is not the end of the “friendly occupation”, but only the first stage in reclaiming Lebanon’s sovereignty.

[19] However, the law (Article 3) does not provide amnesty to “crimes of assassination or attempted  assassination of religious figures, political leaders, and foreign or Arab diplomats” (AI 2004).

[20] Lebanese policy analyst, interview, Beirut, 5 May 2005.

[21] The number of victims remains disputed and range from 350 to more than 3,500 (Shahid 2002: p. 44).

[22] Hobeika is also believed to have planned the ill-fated assassination attempt on Hizbollah’s spiritual leader Mohammed Hussein Fadlallah in March 1985 as well as a number of other assassinations attempt targeting leading politicians and rivals (Gambill and Endrawos 2002).

[23] Hobeika’s testimony was part of a war crimes lawsuit against Israel’s prime minister Ariel Sharon filed by relatives of the victims in the Belgian High Court. On 24 September 2004, the court dismissed the war crimes case against Sharon and ruled that there was no longer a legal basis for the lawsuit, see www.indictsharon.net.

[24] This included ordering the assassination of the leader of the Maronite “Tigers” militia Dany Chamoun (1990), the LF-official Elias Zayek (1989) and prime minister Rashid Karami (1987), as well as the attempted assassination of defence minister Michel Murr (1991), see (Abdelnour 2004).  

[25] Sultan Abu al-Aynayn has been sentenced to death in absentia on weapons charges and for forming an armed militia.

[26] Hizbollah official, interview, Beirut, 6 May 2005.

[27] Palestinian political leader, interview, Beirut, 5 May 2005.

[28] The Cairo Agreement was signed in 1969 between the Lebanese authorities and the PLO. It gave the Palestinian refugees the right to employment, to form local committees and bear arms in the camps and to engage in cross-border combat against Israel(Knudsen in press).

[29] A notable exception is the public apologetics of the Maronite militiaman Ass’ad Shatari which was published as three articles in the Lebanese Arabic newspaper “An-Nahar”, 14–16 February 2002. Shaftari apologised to the victims and argued that sectarianism had betrayed Lebanon and its peoples, see (Haugb¿lle 2002).

[30] Lebanese policy analyst, interview, Beirut, 5 May 2005.

[31] Lebanese PhD-graduate, interview, Beirut, 27 April 2005.

[32] Solidere, the company in charge of rebuilding central Beirut, launched an international urban design and ideas competition for rebuilding the Martyrs’ Square. The competition results were announced recently, see www.beirutmartyrssquare.com.

[33] “The problem of the Lebanese evacuees shall be resolved fundamentally and the right of every Lebanese evicted since 1975 to return to the place from which he was evicted shall be established” (Taif Agreement Online).

[34] The exact number of IDPs in Lebanon is not known and estimates vary by a factor of ten; from 50,000 to more than 500,000 (Global IDP Project 2004).

[35] Lebanese UNDP official, interview, Beirut, 27 April 2005.

[36] Lebanese policy analyst, interview, Beirut, 5 May 2005.

[37] Boutros Sfeir proclaimed that “the curtain has been lowered for good on this black past and now we must close ranks to defend freedoms and human rights in Lebanon” (Sfeir quoted in, Gambill 2001b).

[38] For a more detailed account of the militias’ informal economy, see (Picard 2000).

[39] In recent months, Hizbollah and the largest Palestinian faction Fateh have denounced resolution 1559 and criticised the call for disarmament and called for the other Security Council resolutions targeting Israel to be implemented first (Daily Star 25/04/05).

[40] For this reason, the Council [for the Development] of the South (Ar. Majlis al-janub) has been derided as the Council of the Pockets (Ar. Majlis al-juyub), see (Norton 1986: p. 166).