January 1975 saw heavy Israeli attacks on the South. Israeli forces razed Kfar Chouba, a border village, about a week after 7 January (Hanf), and Palestinian commandos shelled army positions in Tyre during border clashes with the Lebanese army (de Clerck and Malsagne). The figures for 3 January come from contemporary press reports.

Antoine Khuraych headed the Maronite Church from his election on 3 February 1975 (enthronement 9 February) until 1986, styling himself the 'patriarch of dialogue'.

Hanf: Franjieh accepted Karami's condition for sending the army between Tripoli and Zgharta, Ghanem's removal; his replacement, Hanna Said, was a 'politically uncontentious' colonel.

Cardinal Paolo Bertoli's mission lasted from 9 to 14 November 1975 (de Clerck and Malsagne's chronology). Like the French envoy Couve de Murville, he backed a limited revision of the National Pact.

The siege of Damour had begun on 9 January, before the fall of Karantina; the main massacre began on 20 January (Hanf, Ménargues, Fisk, de Clerck and Malsagne; Traboulsi gives 22 or 24 January). Jiyeh fell the same day. The attackers were mainly PLA, Saiqa and Fatah units, with Lebanese leftist parties. Estimates of the dead range from about 150 bodies found plus 200 missing (Fisk) and 300-584 (de Clerck and Malsagne) to about 900 (Ménargues); some 5,000 people fled by land and sea.

Talks in France with the government and Mitterrand's opposition left Jumblatt sure that France could do nothing in Lebanon against Syrian and US opposition (Traboulsi). His tour, by boat from encircled West Beirut to Cyprus, then Cairo, Algiers and Paris, sought Arab contingents to offset the Syrians.

Israel, Hanf notes, would accept no Arab troops south of the 'red line', Syrian ones least of all. When a Syrian unit entered Nabatiyeh in January 1977, an Israeli protest got it withdrawn and the Palestinians kept the town.

Vance's airport motorcade skirted Sabra and Chatila after a Beirut visit, dated by Fisk to autumn 1977, to hear the government's views on the Palestinians' future.

Robert Fisk, who reported from the area, saw Israeli tanks on Lebanese soil near Ibl al-Saqi and Israeli shelling of Christian villages such as Rachaya al-Fukhar, where Palestinian guerrillas had dug in.

Avoiding the risk of hitting their own men, and leaving positions hard to hold, were the main aims of the Syrian pull-back in Hanf's reading: a tactical move.

Musa al-Sadr travelled to Libya on 25 August (de Clerck and Malsagne) at the invitation of the Libyan government (Ménargues) and was never seen again; Hanf dates the disappearance to September. Beirut papers speculated about the Shah's secret police or Libyan intelligence. Fisk writes that he was almost certainly killed in Libya. The loss mobilised the Shi'a and later strengthened Amal.

Historians describe the Syrian pull-back from Beirut in 1980 as a redeployment to the Bekaa and to mountain positions overlooking the capital, with a garrison kept in West Beirut (Hanf). The Lebanese army could not replace the departing Arab Deterrent Force everywhere (Picard).

Fisk: violating the UN's agreements with Israel, Haddad's militia set up positions inside the UNIFIL zone in spring 1980, beside At-Tiri, near Beit Yahoun and at ruined Rashaf, where it parked a Sherman tank reached by a road built with Israeli help.

In Ménargues's account Damascus rejected Takieddine Solh, finding him too lukewarm about Lebanese–Syrian friendship, and offered three names instead, Selim Hoss's among them.

Ménargues counts 10 dead and 62 wounded from two car bombs in Achrafieh, Bashir Gemayel's power base.

Dates differ. De Clerck and Malsagne's chronology has the Lebanese Forces controlling East Beirut from 31 October 1980. Ménargues puts the LF's 48-hour assault on Ain al-Remmaneh, held by Elias Hannouche's Chamounists, ten days after the 10 November car bombs, around 20 November 1980.