Its members were technocrats and businessmen; the one politician, Fouad Boutros, held both foreign affairs and defence (Traboulsi). Early on, at Syria's behest, it brought in press censorship (Hanf, Fisk); Traboulsi also mentions an order for militias to surrender their arms.

Sami al-Khatib took over the ADF from Ahmad al-Hajj, who never won Syria's trust, and led it until 1983.

Syria, Hanf writes, had lost interest in disarming the Palestinians by autumn 1977, with Sadat's initiative under way, and the deal soon counted for nothing. It had bound the PLO to keep out of a ten-kilometre belt beside the Israeli frontier and, chiefly, to halt raids and shelling across it.

By now Syria was fighting on the Palestinians' side. Hanf says the clashes ended once the Arab Deterrent Force's Saudi and Sudanese contingents deployed between Chiyah and Ain el-Remmaneh.

Neither parliament nor president could enforce the resolution, Hanf notes. The 74 deputies in attendance passed it without dissent: it reserved arms to the legitimate Lebanese forces, told the Palestinians and 'other parties' to end armed action, and applied Lebanese law to all on Lebanese soil.

Historians date the Ehden killings to 13 June (de Clerck and Malsagne) or 14 June (Hanf). A unit of some 200 men (Traboulsi) led by Samir Geagea attacked the Frangieh residence; besides Tony Frangieh, his wife and their three-year-old daughter, about thirty relatives and supporters were killed. The Phalange presented the raid as retaliation for the killing of their local leader Jud al-Bayeh in early June; Bashir Gemayel denied ordering the killing of the family. The raid also turned on control of the Chekka cement works. Syrian troops then occupied Ehden and much of the north.

Hanf writes that the Lebanese Front was left with an enclave of roughly a tenth of Lebanon once Syrian troops had moved into the northern Christian mountains, Koura, Batroun and the coast as far as the Madfoun bridge. Frangieh gave Kataeb members in the north until the month's end to give up their weapons and quit the party, or else leave.

The Qaa massacre is dated to the night of 27-28 June (de Clerck and Malsagne) or to 29 June (Hanf); Ras Baalbek and Jdeidet al-Fakiha were also raided. De Clerck and Malsagne blame Syrians in civilian clothes, carrying name lists and guided by local Christian members of the SSNP and the Communist Party, and see the killings as revenge for Ehden. Hanf counts 26 dead, de Clerck and Malsagne 32 to 36. The community's Supreme Council asked that a day of national mourning be held.

Hanf has Syrian guns shelling Ain el-Remmaneh on the day of mourning called after the Qaa killings, and the Syrian troops ignoring Sarkis's order to cease fire. Ménargues puts Bashir Gemayel's brief detention at a Syrian checkpoint at the end of July.

Fisk adds that the Syrian shelling slackened around this time after sonic booms from a pair of Israeli jets flying low over West Beirut.

Hanf writes that Major Haddad's forces fired at Kaukaba on the units sent south in early August, men of the 'vanguard' Syria trusted, and drove them into retreat. Haddad later rebelled openly against the army command, and Israel took over paying his men.

In February 1978 Achkar had led the Lebanese soldiers in the clash with Syrian troops at Fayadiyeh; in October he left the army with about twenty men and founded a 'Revolutionary Lebanese Army Movement'. Boutros was due to fly with the president to the Arab summit in Baghdad when the Lebanese Forces, avenging Achkar, ambushed him on the way to the airport. Lieutenant Qozhaya Chamoun, who led the convoy, was abducted and later murdered; Boutros himself got away.