Syria, Hanf writes, had lost interest in disarming the Palestinians by autumn 1977, with Sadat's initiative under way, and the deal soon counted for nothing. It had bound the PLO to keep out of a ten-kilometre belt beside the Israeli frontier and, chiefly, to halt raids and shelling across it.

Robert Fisk, who reported from the area, saw Israeli tanks on Lebanese soil near Ibl al-Saqi and Israeli shelling of Christian villages such as Rachaya al-Fukhar, where Palestinian guerrillas had dug in.

Israel's Christian allies emerged with a slightly wider strip, spanning nearly the whole frontier from sea to Hermon; Fisk dates the tank withdrawal to 26 September.

Historians date the start of Operation Litani to 14 March (de Clerck and Malsagne, Traboulsi, Quéméner; de Clerck's chronology gives 15 March) and its end to 21 March. Up to 25,000 Israeli soldiers and 120 tanks took part (de Clerck and Malsagne). Estimates of the dead range from about 300 Palestinian fighters (de Clerck and Malsagne) to about 2,000 people, mostly civilians (Fisk; de Clerck and Malsagne; Picard). Estimates of the displaced range from 150,000 (Hanf's refugee table) and more than 200,000 (de Clerck and Malsagne, Picard) to 285,000 (Lebanese government figure cited by Fisk). On 15 March Israeli aircraft bombed the Palestinian camps of Beirut, Tyre and Damour.

Resolution 425 was adopted with Resolution 426, which set up the force; the USSR abstained (de Clerck and Malsagne). UNIFIL later numbered about 6,000 soldiers, with France providing the largest first contingent (1,290 men).

Fisk dates the arrival in Tyre of UNIFIL's first unit, Colonel Jean Germain Salvan's French paratroopers, to 23 March. That morning, at the nearby Hassan Borro barracks, Palestinians and Lebanese officers nearly opened fire over the handover.

Fisk adds that during the invasion Gur declared that Israel would fall back to the Christian enclaves as a border 'security belt': the strip that became Major Haddad's.

Hanf has Syrian guns shelling Ain el-Remmaneh on the day of mourning called after the Qaa killings, and the Syrian troops ignoring Sarkis's order to cease fire. Ménargues puts Bashir Gemayel's brief detention at a Syrian checkpoint at the end of July.

Fisk adds that the Syrian shelling slackened around this time after sonic booms from a pair of Israeli jets flying low over West Beirut.

Hanf writes that Major Haddad's forces fired at Kaukaba on the units sent south in early August, men of the 'vanguard' Syria trusted, and drove them into retreat. Haddad later rebelled openly against the army command, and Israel took over paying his men.

Musa al-Sadr travelled to Libya on 25 August (de Clerck and Malsagne) at the invitation of the Libyan government (Ménargues) and was never seen again; Hanf dates the disappearance to September. Beirut papers speculated about the Shah's secret police or Libyan intelligence. Fisk writes that he was almost certainly killed in Libya. The loss mobilised the Shi'a and later strengthened Amal.

Schools, hospitals and factories were destroyed in the new bombardment, and Lebanese gendarmes logged 2,000 impacts a day in Achrafieh. Hanf links it to the Camp David agreement reached a few days before.

Ménargues writes that when the Moukafaha, Johnny Abdo's own intervention unit, arrested Elie Hobeika for allegedly having the Saudi ambassador's helicopter fired on, Bashir Gemayel had about a hundred army officers abducted; they were traded for Hobeika three weeks later.

Ménargues: once the Saudis said in March 1979 they would hand their positions to the army, an army–militia clash looked inevitable; intelligence chief Johnny Abdo reopened contact with Bashir.