Chapter 4 looks at the changes that occurred as a result of the war in the socio-economic situation of the country and their implications for the family, for women and for some specific groups identified in the ToR. It stresses mainly the negative impact of those changes, while the following chapter puts the emphasis on the avenues war has opened for positive change, and focuses on the role of women as actors (Chapter 5 will use empirical findings to stress women's survival strategies in response to conflict).

However, many of those changes have dual aspects which are often difficult to separate. For instance, while the war has increased women's involvement in remunerated activities, thus increasing their responsibilities and workload, it has given some a taste for a kind of autonomy which could have been unknown to them before.

4.1.1 Contrasting life-styles

4.1.2 Disruption of the social fabric and its impact on family structures

Displacement[14]

Displacement is the most serious phenomenon that affected the Lebanese population as a consequence of war. This internal migration followed a concerted plan that was executed in different stages by numerous actors on the war scene. Two-thirds of the population were displaced. A distinction should be made between temporary and permanent displacement. The former was provoked by internal strife and external aggression, such as the Israeli invasions of 1978 and 1982 and the fight between Syrian forces and Lebanese militias. In those cases, the people would abandon their homes and go back as soon as fighting had ceased. The latter was provoked by massacres and expulsions aimed at creating confessionally homogenous zones.

Displacements were not continuous but occurred in separate, successive waves, corresponding to the different rounds of the conflict. During 1975-76, approximately 300,000 people were displaced in the capital city of Beirut alone. From 1978-82, an additional 150,000 people fled due to fighting in their area and the Israeli invasion. From 1982-90 a further 360,000 people were uprooted (Lebanese NGO Forum, 1994).

Many surveys and studies have been undertaken to determine the magnitude of the problem of permanent displacement. However, any attempt to compare the figures on population movements and distribution reveals large disparities. The most striking difference is the 900,000 put forward by Faour and, at the other end of the spectrum, the 450,000 of the Ministry of the Displaced (hereafter MOD). For the purpose of this report the figures presented in the findings of the Beaudoin and Kasparian's study (1991) will be relied on. In 1987, they estimated the number of the displaced to be 670,000, representing 22 per cent of the Lebanese population. These figures do not include those displaced in the 1989 conflict.

The same variations apply when it comes to the geographic distribution of the displaced population by province, mouhafazat, or by district number, caza. For instance, Faour and Beaudoin and Kasparian estimated the displaced population in the south at 12.2 per cent, while the MOD put forward the figure of 23.1 per cent. Despite the many discrepancies, all surveys give some indication of the scale of a phenomenon that has affected every region of Lebanon.

More than a million people have been displaced during the war; some were permanently dislocated, the rest returned when hostilities ceased. The social fabric of rural and urban communities was severely affected; life-styles were disrupted. The massive migratory movements across the country have resulted in the disruption of the cultural and social organization of the displaced communities. They have also affected the receiving societies confronted with different cultural practices and values of those coming from rural backgrounds into an urban environment or vice versa.

Internal migration was a major determining factor in the demographic changes that resulted from the war. As a result of this planned human reorganization of the country, the population of Beirut, for instance, underwent major changes: the exodus of a large part of its original inhabitants was balanced by the inflow of refugees from other areas. In the southern suburbs of the capital, 30 per cent of the population is composed of refugees. As noted earlier, this phenomenon has affected every region of the country to varying degrees (Beaudoin and Kasparian, 1991).

The civil war has displaced many rural communities into urban localities. The forced displacement due to political strategies and organized by the militias reinforced the pre-existing rural-urban migratory trend. The major phenomena which characterized the urbanization process in Lebanon could be summed up as follows:

• the cycles of rural migration prior to and during the war;
• the displacement of the urban population into safer areas, some of which were not yet urbanised at the time;
• the expansion of urban agglomerations to reach neighbouring rural areas (USAID, 1995).

These phenomena have resulted in a continuously changing spatial reorganization. The increased urbanization of the population was paralleled with the emptying of the rural areas from a substantial part of the active population. According to ECWA (Abu Nasr et al., 1985), in 1975 a large proportion of the country's population (65 per cent) lived in urban areas. The UN (EIU 1995) estimated that after the war the capital alone had a population of 1.5 million, which represents almost half of the entire population of the country. The imbalance in the population distribution is one of the main compelling factors for the Government to organize the return of the displaced. A demographic balance is hoped to be restored with the resettlement of the displaced from over-populated areas to the nearly empty areas of displacement.

Modification of the family structure

The USJ-Laval survey (Beaudoin and Kasparian) has noted the change in the composition of the displaced families: the size of the household is much larger than in non-displaced families. In east Beirut, for instance, the average displaced household has 5.19 persons compared with 4.03 for the average of non-displaced households (hereafter N-D).

• Twenty-five per cent of the displaced households (v/s 21 per cent in the N-D) are large nuclear families with the father, mother, and 4.29 children;
• twenty-three per cent of the displaced households have no children under 18 years (against 30 per cent in the N-D families);
• the households are more frequently composed of the nuclear family in addition to relatives, (14.5 per cent against 11 per cent N-D);
• the proportion of households headed by a single parent is also higher than for the N-D population: 5.2 per cent and 4.1 per cent respectively.

The survey is not gender segregated[15] and gives no indication as to the proportion of women-headed households, the percentage of widows is not indicated. In general, displaced people tend to marry later than others, the family is also larger. They tend to cohabit with relatives more frequently. The displaced population is young, making up 48 per cent. There is also a high number of single young people.

Family life and social ties

In most cases, displacement has disrupted the (extended) family and social networks while migration of men has affected even the nuclear family. The survey conducted by the USJ/Laval universities shows that links with those who remained in the village were totally severed: 69 per cent of the refugees never visited people from the original home area; 53 per cent of the displaced, aged 17 years and more, have not kept in touch with their places of origin; 37 per cent have built "good" relationships in their new milieu; 32.7 per cent have occasional meetings; while 30.4 per cent have never built relationships with people in the receiving areas. Generational differences are important in the process of adaptation, those who were born in exile had less difficulties in creating social ties. Gender is another variable in the dynamics of adaptation: the survey shows that men were better integrated than women, especially in the 40-49 age group.

Conversely, the family has played an important role in providing material support and help for some of the displaced in the receiving areas. In certain cases, families provided shelter and food in the absence of a proper state system.

The organized return of the displaced will be yet another cause of disruption and pain. Given the lengthy period over which some of the displaced have been living outside their original home area, it is likely that there will be differences in attitudes to return as some of the displaced have re-built some social networks. For many, going "home" may not be a natural outcome of a decade of exile, while making a new home in a new area may be perfectly consistent with their new aspirations.

Closed communities

The disruption of the social fabric was paralleled with the re-enforcement of sectarian cleavages. Fear and insecurity are known to be essential factors in the mobilization of a community along confessional lines. The individual and collective response to fear and violence was to seek refuge in the familiar.

Sectarian affiliations have been reinforced during the war, and have undermined burgeoning class identities. Thus Lebanon has experienced a reversal; it has departed from "a natural historical evolution" (Khalaf and Denoeux, 1988), and has gone back to creating closed communities. The confessionalization of the country is therefore a regression in terms of modernity and the development of a national process. It has thwarted the evolution of social integration which had started before the war when many "encouraging signs such as the increase in inter-sectarian marriages and the emergence of modern parties and unions" were found (G. Salameh, 1991).

Thus, the "confessionalization" of the society has eroded civility and sharpened the segmentation of the social fabric by leading to a breakdown of intercommunal relations. This consequence of the war was accentuated by the spatial segregation of the different communities following the attempts by the militias to create a federation of homogenous cantons.

The climate of religious intolerance was paralleled by the rise of religious conservatism in certain groups. The tendency to narrow religious interpretations was accompanied by the reinforcement of patriarchal values that can further weaken women's positions (Chapter 6 mentions the impact this development has had on issues such as the Personal Status Laws). The opportunities which were opened to them during the war in terms of education and skills could be reversed. In certain cases women are actually asked to revert to their former traditional roles and leave the space for men returning from migration and for the unemployed.[16]

4.2.1 Demographic characteristics

Table 7

4.2.2 Age and sex composition

The demographic structure is characterized by a very young population. An examination of the age composition of the population indicates that almost the half of the population is under 25 years of age, males representing a slightly higher percentage than the females in this category.

Table 10

• It is generally assumed that women tend to constitute the bulk of the population after conflict and provoke an imbalance in the female/male ratio. But this does not seem to be the case in Lebanon (according to MOSA figures) despite a large amount of casualties and an important migratory trend.

4.2.3 Nuptiality characteristics

4.2.4 Some consequences for women

• Because the majority of war casualties are men, it is usually women who are left to care for the injured and the disabled. If the husband was killed, or handicapped, often women had to find ways to earn income. Despite the fact that they were usually unprepared, inexperienced and unskilled. Others, however, would resort to charitable organizations and therefore increase their dependency on aid.
• The absence of men and the increase of female-headed households is one important demographic change that occurred in the household structure as a result of the war (14.2 per cent of female-headed households in 1996 excluding the wives of absent husbands in both rural and urban areas, MOSA, 1996). This change meant an important reduction of economic sufficiency for these women, which often leads to poverty considering the difficulties they have in coping alone.
• The rural areas which were already neglected by the Government prior to the war were neglected further by non-governmental and inter-governmental organizations during the war. These areas were also affected by the war in terms of migration and lack of financial resources. The number of women-headed households has increased, forcing women to become the main income-generating person in the family. Women had to face alone the workload and had to put up with harsh working conditions both at home and outside. In agriculture work for instance, they had to deal with increased costs of imput and decreased costs of outputs, while receiving up to 40 to 50 per cent less wages than men. The problem is further compounded by the average size of most rural families: more than five[20] (Ministry of Agriculture -- hereafter MOA -- 1994).

• With the migration of the male-skilled labour force women were often left behind. This situation also reinforced their maternal role and responsibility. They had to cope with increased responsibility for the education and protection of their children, while being weakened themselves by loss of moral and financial support. The lack of support has weighed heavily on their coping capacity.
• Displacement entailed loss of material security. In most cases, men lost their jobs, adding to the workload and stress of women. All these factors have contributed to make the displaced women the largest vulnerable group in Lebanon. (The figures given only indicate the number of permanently displaced people. However, more than two-thirds of the population has been displaced at least once).
• Another important consequence of the migration of men was that less girls could find a suitable husband. The unmarried woman still carries a heavy social stigma in the country. "In a society in which an adult woman's status is still determined first and foremost by whether she is married or has children, thousands of women without prospects of marriage will find themselves unable to fulfil traditional social role expectations" (Al Raida, 1995:58).
• Women on their own (mainly divorced or single) have to put up with increased social pressure as they are also looked down upon and their "morality" is subject to increased scrutiny and control by the extended family and the society lest they deviate from the prescribed social norms.
• Research is needed in order to determine the impact of such change in the marital status of women and the new social patterns that are emerging. It could also underline the new opportunities that the (forced) departure from traditional roles has opened for women, for instance, increased education and higher involvement in the public sphere.

Before the war, Lebanon was a very prominent cultural centre in the Middle East as well as an educational centre for the region due to the high standards of education.

Table 12

Today, despite 20 years of civil strife, the illiteracy rates have decreased significantly. The MOSA's rates (1996) compared to UN rates (in EIU, 1995) show an actual increase in literacy rates during the war. The ratio is 2:1 female to male due to an overall tendency to favour male education over girls' education in the country.

There has been an overall decline in illiteracy since 1975, but the pattern has been the same over the years, illiterate women are twice as numerous as men. This apparent contradiction between high female illiteracy rates and female higher school enrolment can be explained by the generational difference. Illiteracy rates are inflated by lack of education in older age groups. The older groups of women tend to have a much higher illiteracy rate than the younger ones. Illiteracy rates are the same for girls and boys up to the group age of 20-24. In older generations, however, women's illiteracy rates more than double, 71.3 per cent of illiterate women are 45 years and over (MOSA, 1996).

School enrolment: in Lebanon, laws and decrees provide equal educational opportunities to girls and boys. However, the enforcement of those rights remains irregular and often contradicts traditions and customs which still prevail in certain parts of the country, especially in the rural areas.

Table 13

The number of females who have completed or are currently enrolled in schools shows no significant difference with the male population at the primary, intermediate, or secondary levels. Girls are even slightly more numerous. However, the number of girls entering university and higher education drops significantly. This reflects the persistence of early marriage for girls and the preference for higher education for boys. Only 40 per cent of those who hold a secondary degree will specialize in a field (MOSA, 1996).

• The educational structure of the population in 1994-1996 compared to the pre-war period indicates an increase of the enrolment of girls in schools. Their percentage in the total student body is rising. According to Abu Nasr (1992), the war has provided girls with an opportunity to improve their education in the rural areas deserted by men. In the absence of appropriate male suitors, girls sought higher education. Consequently, "in secondary schools, which were usually characterized by a significant drop-out of female students approaching the traditional age of marriage" rates of participation increased even more.
• Overall, women have had a higher education during the war. However, these figures need to be broken down regionally. Regional variations are likely to show for instance that in the rural areas of the north there is much higher discrimination against girls in the educational sector. Despite discriminatory practices, women's access to education has improved during the last two decades in rural areas. But families will still give boys access to private education while girls are sent to public schools where they pay minimal fees (MOA, 1994).

4.4.1 Living conditions

The quality of life has been deeply affected by the war. In the 1996 UNDP Human Development Index (HDI), Lebanon ranks 101 out of 174 countries.

During the first part of the war (1975-82) many social and economic factors contributed to maintaining a certain balance. However, from 1985 onwards, when inflation reached a peak, the economic crisis reached unprecedented proportions. Access to, and distribution of, resources became a major issue; the uneven distribution of wealth could not be controlled by a collapsed State.

Wages

In 1985 the average inflation rate was 60 per cent a year. In 1987 the minimum wage represented only 35 per cent of the value it had in 1974. For instance, the Lebanese engineer, teacher, employee, who were slightly less remunerated than their European counterparts in terms of parity and purchasing power when the war began, were now paid five to ten times less (K. Hamdan, 1989).

Most Lebanese have had to drastically reduce the quality and quantity of goods they consume. Two studies concerning the household income and expenditure before and during the war indicated that a household expenditure per year had decreased by 25 per cent between 1966 and 1985. The deterioration of the living conditions of the Lebanese is also reflected in the poverty line. In 1987 the poverty line was calculated at $225 per month for a family of five, at a time when the actual minimum salary was about $31 per month, or 13.8 per cent compared to 33.2 per cent in 1977 (K. Hamdan, 1989).[21]

Poverty

War has also been responsible for the impoverishment of the population during the last 20 years: the GDP has fallen to 40 per cent of the level it was projected to have reached had the war not begun. Besides the damage to the infrastructure, unbridled inflation and unemployment, the war was also responsible for the fragmentation of the labour market. In addition, the displacement of a large proportion of the population led to the decline of living conditions, educational levels and health care. The displaced population includes a high percentage of poor people with 75 per cent living under the absolute poverty line.

According to the recent study by ESCWA (1996), in Lebanon today, 28 per cent of Lebanese families are estimated to live below the absolute poverty line (which includes food expenses and other basic needs such as health, education, housing and clothing). This percentage represents as much as one-third of the total population, or 1 million people. Of those, 7.25 per cent, 250,000 people, live below the extreme poverty line (i.e. meeting only minimum food requirements).

The regional distribution of poverty levels shows that two-thirds of the extremely poor (180,000 people) live in the rural areas and represent more than one quarter of the population of those areas. The large majority of families whose primary income derives from agriculture are poor (75 per cent), while 40 per cent of those live below the extreme poverty line. In cities and their suburbs, there are around 750,000 poor of whom 100,000 are extremely poor. ESCWA's findings show that 31 per cent of the urban poor belong to families whose primary provider works in government administration, and 26 per cent to those who work in the industry.

The educational level of the poor is low compared to the rest of the population, heads of family do not receive higher and secondary education while their children have a high drop-out percentage. This is due to the insufficient number of government-supported schools and the high cost of education for the family in general coupled with a low return in terms of economic gains or jobs. The access of poor families to health care facilities is also limited because of the costs involved and the lack of sufficient governmental health centres. Space per individual is less than 10 square metres. The houses are partly destroyed, and suffer from the lack of sewage systems or intermixture with drinking water. Poor women are even more discriminated against regarding access to health care and access to food.

4.4.2 Working conditions

In a survey of skilled workers, the LCPS (1993) has found that there is a general decline in the standards of working conditions of people. Remuneration tends to be offered on a low basis with "minimally acceptable" standards and working conditions. As noted earlier, women tend to receive up to 40 to 50 per cent less than men, especially in rural areas. Women's labour in agriculture does not benefit from any legal protection. In general, women have been used as cheap labour in order to replace the male workforce.

Salaries

Wage-earners constitute 55 to 60 per cent of the total workforce. Salaries have been eroded due to inflation during the war and its aftermath. Salaries in the private sector are not regulated - except for the minimum wage and the adjustment rates. During the last two decades, the minimum salary lost 70 per cent of its value at the fixed rate of the Lebanese pound. Due to the adjustment rates that decrease with wage increases, the medium salaries have dropped faster than the minimum wage (ESCWA, 1996). This is an essential element in the spread of poverty among wage-earners.

The imbalance between the high cost of living and the inadequate salaries has had many consequences. For instance, a larger number of people have become self-employed. The majority have taken up a second activity, usually in the informal sector, to compensate for the low salaries. The more drastic solution was migration, mainly to the oil-rich Arab countries.

The displaced

For at least 22 per cent of the population, that is the permanently displaced, the war has deeply transformed their living conditions, the nature and the structure of their work. Agricultural producers and labourers were affected the most by displacement, 22 per cent were unemployed after migration while 64 per cent had to change their profession after a long period of unemployment (Beaudoin and Kasparian, 1991).

The economic activity rate of the displaced population is slightly lower than in the rest of the population (29 per cent and 30 per cent respectively); the unemployment rate is higher than in the rest (6 per cent and 9 per cent respectively: these figures do not include first time jobseekers); the occupational distribution of the displaced shows that the majority work in low status and low paid jobs. Conversely, the working situation of some displaced people improved during the war.

4.5.1 Labour force profile

The last statistical survey on the labour force was undertaken by the Central Directorate of Statistics in 1970. Subsequently, all available data has been based on partial field surveys or extrapolations. The National Labour Office has undertaken two major surveys concerning the labour force and the types of employment. The results were not available during fieldwork. MOSA's survey includes some information on the labour force.

Table 14

To face the growing economic crisis, most Lebanese families had to multiply their income by increasing their participation in the labour market, thus, while the resident population increased by 37 per cent between 1970 and 1987, the active working population increased by 60 per cent. Despite the under-registration of the active female population, especially in rural areas, the number of women working increased from 90,000 to 145,000 for the same period and reached 17 per cent of the total active population (K.Hamdan 1989).

Other figures indicate that in 1970 the total of the labour force amounted to 572,000; 94 per cent was employed (538,000) and the rest, 34,000, were looking for jobs. In 1987 the labour force was estimated to have increased to 875,000-900,000, which represents a growth rate of 55 per cent over 17 years, while the population increase was lower: 35 per cent. In 1991 the labour force was estimated to be similar to 1987 (LCPS, 1993).

According to ILO estimates (ILO, 1977) in 1975, 18.4 per cent of the labour force was female and 81.4 per cent was male with a total of 745,000 persons. MOSA findings for 1994-1996 are as follows: the economically active are 944,281 men representing 79.2 per cent or 748,681, and women representing 20.8 per cent or 195,601. In any case, these figures indicate an increase in women's participation in the labour force and a slight increase of the overall percentage vis-à-vis men.

The participation rates of both men and women in pre-and post-war Lebanon indicate that in 1970 only 9 out of every 100 women were part of the labour force compared to 43 men out of 100. In 1994-96, according to MOSA, 15.7 women out of 100 (aged 10 years and over) and 12.9 per cent of the total female population are part of the economically active population. For men, 62 out of 100 are similarly engaged.

In 1970 women between the age of 20 to 24 had the highest participation rate, followed by women aged between 25 to 29. In 1996 it was the 25-29 age group which displayed the highest participation, followed by the 30-34 age group, with the 20 -24 age group in third place (MOSA, 1996).

The regional distribution indicates that in 1970 the participation rates were highest in the capital and in rural areas with populations less than 1,000. However, Beirut suburbs and other cities had lower rates than the rural areas. After the war, the highest participation rates were in the capital, followed by its suburbs, while the rural areas have lost a large part of their work force due to heavy migration and displacement.

4.5.2 The labour market

Activity rate and unemployment

Conflicting information abounds concerning the labour market in war-torn Lebanon. For Labaki (1989), the unemployment rate reached 21 per cent in 1985, compared to 5.4 per cent in 1970, while the activity rate has gone down from 27 per cent in 1970 to an estimated level of 15 per cent to 13.5 per cent in 1985. K. Hamdan (1989) gives the opposite view: the active population increased 60 per cent between 1970 and 1987. The global economic activity rate reached 30 per cent in 1987 against 26.9 per cent in 1970. Contradicting assumptions and studies which declared massive unemployment rates, such as Hamdan's survey in 1987 of 60,000 households, indicates that unemployment was almost non-existent at only 7 to 8 per cent. This discrepancy is probably due to a definitional issue of employment.[22] As noted in the section on economy, recent studies indicate that the rate of unemployment has been estimated at 35 per cent in 1990. The average duration of unemployment for 66 per cent of the unemployed is longer than six months. In agriculture this is the case for 79 per cent of the unemployed, 51 per cent in services and 44 per cent in industry (EIU, 1995).

Sectoral distribution of the labour force

The percentage of the labour force in different sectors as found in the UNDP Human Development Report in 1993 indicates that in 1965, 2 per cent of the labour force was in agriculture and only 14 per cent in 1992. In 1965, 24 per cent worked in the industry which involved 27 per cent of the labour force in 1992; and finally, the share of the service sector increased from 47 per cent in 1965 to 59 per cent in 1992 (K. Hamdan, 1996).

The increasing tertiarization of the active population is a war-related trend. It took the form of an excessive development of small trade, businesses and non-productive services and activities. This development has led to the emergence of a marginalized social class which was not included in the productive process; it has created more jobs but had an overall destabilizing effect on the economy. As of 1994 the reconstruction and development programmes were expected to provide an increase in job opportunities throughout the rest of the decade. However, this increase will probably have a much bigger effect in the cities than in the villages since reconstruction activities are concentrated in urban areas and require appropriate skills and training that are currently available only in large urban areas.

The agricultural industry, which constitutes a primary source of income to many rural communities, is facing considerable regional competition. The shrinking profits from agricultural activities is slowly depriving this industry from its manpower which is seeking alternative means of income, mainly in the construction areas.


The informal sector: this aspect of the war economy is only partially documented. The development and extension of the informal economic sector during the war has reached much bigger proportions. The disintegration of the public sector and the collapse of the State have resulted in a spectacular development of a "parallel economy" and black market.

Labour migration

Significant fluctuations in out-migration and return movements occurred throughout the war. Hundreds of thousands of Lebanese left the country, but many returned when there was hope for a settlement and for economic recovery. As neither materialized, emigration resumed.

Prior to the war, between 1960 and 1974, emigration was characterized by large-scale movement, mainly towards the Arab oil-producing States (10,000 people left each year). When the war started in 1975 migratory movements accelerated and changed in nature: in the late seventies they affected 20 to 25 per cent of the active Lebanese population (K. Hamdan, 1989).The remittances, which prior to the war averaged $300 million per year, reached almost $2 billion a year in 1982 and represented 75 per cent of GDP in that year.

A significant portion of the highly skilled workforce thus moved outside the country. The educational profile of the emigrants shows that the largest percentage (33.6 per cent) of those who left had a university degree. Those with a secondary and intermediate school level each represented 20.3 per cent. Those with only a primary degree formed 18 per cent. The illiterate and those who could read and write only represent 2 per cent and 5.2 per cent respectively (MOSA, 1996).

The consequences for the Lebanese economy were important since it relied increasingly on transfers from Lebanese abroad to survive. Even though remittances contributed to the national economy, over the long term this situation has weakened the economic structure of the country.

Other consequences were the demographic stagnation of the resident Lebanese population; and since labour migration consisted mostly of the active young male population, it has affected the sex balance and age structure.

4.5.3 Impact of these changes on women[23]

Prior to the war, the unequal participation of groups in the wealth of the country was a major cause of its destabilization. Women were more affected by the growing marginalization of regions and groups since they were already excluded from structures of power in the political and military arena and their access to, and control over, economic resources was very limited.

The war

The war has led to further exclusion and lower status of women due to increasingly uneven distribution of resources and growing competition over access to goods. It has weakened women by putting too much strain and responsibility on them, by limiting their economic self-sufficiency, forcing them to take on new roles while the power balance seems to have remained the same.

• The war modified the living and working conditions of the Lebanese and had a different impact on the productive roles and survival strategies of men and women. From 1985 onwards the economic crisis reached unprecedented proportions. The first reaction of households was to use their savings and reduce consumption which had a qualitative differential effect on women. In this process of adaptation, women and girls suffered more as they were usually the first sacrificed in terms of adequate nutrition, education, and health care.
• The temporary or permanent inability of men to fulfil their traditional role as household providers also forced an increasing number of women to provide for their families. Their new responsibilities put additional burdens on them as their workload in the domestic arena was not alleviated accordingly. When employed, women were generally more disadvantaged as they had to work longer hours and be paid less than their male counterparts (sometimes as much as 40 to 50 per cent less (MOA, 1994)). The heavier burdens are shouldered by women heads of households.
• The feminization of the economically active population was a result of out-migration, especially that men tended to emigrate leaving mainly their female relatives behind (Labaki, 1989).
• The migratory trend which has characterized the war period, has created labour shortages in various sectors but it has increased women's involvement and responsibilities, mainly in the agricultural sector where their work is not protected by any legislation.
• The development of the service sector (teaching, health, welfare) has direct implications for women's participation, since this is where it has increased most; women represent 80 per cent of those employed in these sectors.

The post-war

• If we consider that the out-flow of male labour was positively related to the labour force participation rate of women (stimulated by the vacancies created by the departing migrants) then the return migration of war exiles, witnessed the last few years, could negatively affect the demand for women workers as it is already the case in the banking sector for instance.[24] In addition, the Government's economic policy and the strategy proposed by the WB can affect men and women differently. The effect of liberalization and privatization could be a double blow to women since they represent a high proportion of the poor and have little means to cushion the shock of transition. Women can also be negatively affected because of the traditional sexual division of labour.
  
  Women's burden during the war had increased, and structural adjustment policies could weaken them further since:
  • an increased number of women are responsible for providing for their family. Therefore they bear much of the burden when income falls and prices rise;
  • women have taken on more paid work, whether formal or informal, which increases their workload; as the division of labour in the domestic arena remains more or less the same;
  • the lack of sufficient investment in the social sector will affect the development of services such as health care, child care or family planning. Women, generally have less access to those services (especially widows and other women heads of households).

This chapter has noted the deterioration of the living conditions in Lebanon due to conflict and the uneven distribution of resources that could no longer be controlled by a State which had collapsed. The general impoverishment of the population and the particular feminization of poverty was also mentioned. Today one-third of the Lebanese population are estimated to live below the absolute poverty line (ESCWA, 1996) two-thirds of which live in the rural areas. Moreover, the destruction of physical infrastructure in the country included health, welfare and education centres. With the breakdown of the State, public services have collapsed. The reconstruction programme puts little emphasis on the social sector. Health and social affairs represent 5.7 per cent of the planned expenditure of the Horizon 2000.

Studies have shown that women's vulnerability in health matters is both socially and biologically rooted. Their reproductive and sexual roles increase the risk of mortality and sexually transmitted diseases. They have less access to health care facilities than men who are usually in control of the process of production and distribution, even in normal times. In a war situation however, with the reduction of food and other resources, widows and single-headed households have even less access to basic resources. The lack of proper medical care during childbirth or the restricted access to health care centres destroyed or abandoned in the war, contribute to further undermine their physical and mental strength (El Bushra et al., 1993).

Women's roles during the war have changed in both qualitative and quantitative terms. Women were often forced to take on the responsibility of providing for and feeding the family; their involvement outside the home has also increased physical risk. On the other hand, their mobility can be restricted by the children they have to protect. Their maternal role had to be reinforced to keep the family together and protect children from traumatic exposure. Furthermore, the mother's coping mechanisms usually directly affect her children, adding another heavy responsibility on her while she receives little support from dispersed families and broken social networks.

Table 15

• Pregnancy-related deaths are still important. In 1988 the estimated figures for maternal mortality rate were 200 per 100,000 live births (MOA, 1994).
• Infant mortality rate is 56/1,000 (under 5 years of age).
• Malnutrition rates were as found to be 19 per cent (PAP/MOH, 1996). For children aged 5-9 it is greater in the female population in both urban and rural areas (MOA, 1994).

4.6.1 Children

4.6.2 Family planning

4.6.3 Drug abuse

4.6.4 Aids

4.6.5 Access to health care

4.6.7 Psycho-social effects

This section will present some of the findings of surveys and studies on the psychological impact of war undertaken in Lebanon. No analysis was available on the post-war psychological problems displayed by the Lebanese population.

Psychological distress/depression

In 1982 a household surveillance study of 5788 displaced and non-displaced civilians was conducted during the Israeli invasion and siege of Beirut[31] by a group of psychologists for the Faculty of Health Science at the American University of Beirut (Loockwood-Hourani, 1986). In a period where both the displaced and the never-displaced population were subject to an extremely stressful situation.

The aim of the research was to study the psychological reactions of the general civilian population (as opposed to patient groups) to the prevailing war conditions and to identify population groups that may be at a higher risk for mental disorder. Three main groups were selected, those who had not been displaced, those who were displaced due to Israel's attacks, in 1982, and a third group who had been displaced in the beginning of the Lebanese war (1976 and 1978).

The study found that "the occurrence of psychological distress symptoms varied significantly by age, sex, nationality, socio-economic status, loss of physical health and economic loss" (:269). The potential higher risk groups for psychological distress in this population may be young children, older adults, females in general, those with loss of physical health and income, and particularly families who have been displaced since 1976-78.


Demographic characteristics: The demographic distribution showed that the proportion reported to have one or more unusual behaviour was relatively a young one, with 52 per cent under the age of 20. "The highest concentration of symptoms reporters were adults aged 34 and over, followed by children 10 years old and under, with the least concentration in pre-teen and teenagers. A significantly higher proportion of symptom reporters was female" (:271).


Socio-economic status: With respect to the socio-economic status, the greatest proportion of symptom reporters had household heads who had completed a primary level of education, followed by those with a university education.


Loss: In the population under study, 50 per cent had never been displaced compared to 46 per cent displaced during the invasion (1982) and 4 per cent displaced during previous conflicts. Loss of home, of physical health and of income have been found to be significantly associated with the proportion of symptom reporters and the severity of psychological distress.

• the highest relative risk score was associated with loss of physical health (however, there were variations within the displacement group);
• followed by the displaced before June 1982 (2.5 times the risk than those never displaced);
• those who had just been displaced showed no significant difference in the risk of psychological distress (for loss of health and loss of income).

Displaced only: The effect of displacement on psychological distress by age and sex was evident in the distribution of the sample. The displaced-before-June group stood out as that with the greatest number of symptoms reporters in all but the 20-33 year-old age group (in which no significant differences within the displacement categories were observed). However, psychological distress varied greatly by displacement group for men, but very little for women, again with highest symptom levels reported for the before-June group.

The displaced-before-June group was the only displaced group with a significantly elevated risk for psychological distress. Whereas those who occupied abandoned apartments and those displaced into relatives' or friends' homes or into refugee centres did not significantly differ from the never displaced.

Gender differences were also observed in the displaced-before-June group: men seem to report more symptoms of psychological distress (as opposed to the other groups). The interpretation by the authors was that this reflects the "cultural fact that in Lebanese society, a man's social status is greatly determined by his landholding and economic wealth" (: 275). In comparison, for some of those recently displaced -- and despite the greater proportion of those with lost incomes living in empty apartments -- the move was perceived as an actual improvement in living conditions.


The interpretation of the study: The study suggests a relatively low incidence of psychological disorder during the invasion. This may be due to people's perception or interpretation of their displacement status: up to the time of the invasion, the "before-June group had harboured the hope and intention of returning some day to their families, homes, and properties", and had suddenly lost this hope and they perceived themselves as "refugees in their own land". By contrast to those recently displaced, their displaced status was no longer felt as temporary (:274).

These findings suggest a "post-war effect in which time is required for the development or recognition of psychological distress and thus provide evidence for the temporary nature of social integration during war"(:274).

Time factor

A major feature of the war in Lebanon was its duration: almost two decades of intensive fighting alternating with periods of low-intensity war. Most psychologists who have conducted research in Lebanon have stressed the importance of the time factor for the coping capacity of people, and the importance of taking the long-term and more direct effects of the war into consideration when proceeding with such investigations. "As the length of the war increases, one can expect both individuals and society to have fewer and fewer resources to draw upon" (Bryce et al., 1989). Time was also recognized to be an important element in the manifestation of symptoms. Dr. Abdennur (in Georgi, n.d.) pointed out that the effects of stress could appear as much as 20 years after the exposure to stress. There is "a latency period that varies with each individual and his circumstances... if one remains mobilized, one postpones the onset of the symptoms".[32]

The implications of the time variable could be important for the post-war phase. Research should be undertaken to determine whether psychological distress symptoms are more apparent now that people are no longer mobilized for survival and have to revert to a "normal" life.

Mother and child

Another factor affecting the psychological response to conflict is the heavy responsibility of parents in protecting their children and the integrity of their family. Some studies have shown that the inability of the mother to deal with her own problems will affect the ability of the child to cope with his own stress. This responsibility can increase the burden of the mother and can result in increased emotional impairment for her in case she failed to protect her child.

In Lebanon some attempts were made to document the health and psychological outcomes of the war on mothers and children. A study conducted in 1989 (Bryce et al., 1989) [33] sought to determine the relationship between life experiences, the mother's depressions and her child's health. The socio-demographic variable (among other measures) was used to predict the mother's depressive symptomatology and the child's health.

The level of "perceived negative impact of war-related events" was found to be strongly associated with "higher levels of depressive symptomatology among mothers" ( Bryce, 1989:685). The level of a mother's depressive symptomatology was found to be "the best predictor of her child's reported morbidity, with higher levels of symptoms associated with higher levels of morbidity" (ibid. 685).

The study underlined the heavier responsibility of women during the war since mothers act as "mediators between the external environment and the physical and psychological health" of her child. Mothers who perceived the events in their lives as affecting them negatively, mothers who were exposed to more war-related events, and mothers who reported a tendency to respond to these events in an emotional manner, were found to have the highest levels of depressive symptomatology. These symptoms of depression among mothers were associated with greater morbidity among their 5-7 year-old children (Bryce et al., 1989).

Socio-economic factors

Psychological stress and trauma can be aggravated by many factors. Additional stress factors are the loss of home, destitution, loss of family members, witnessing violent acts, having been abused, need to struggle to find food, feeling out of control, loss of personal choice, loss of social networks and community. All these can reduce men's and women's faculty to cope with trauma. Single women and widows can be more at risk having lost their moral and economic support.

Research conducted in 1986 (Lockwood-Hourani et al.), has underlined the importance of societal conditions in the "occurrence of psychological distress symptoms (which vary) significantly by age, sex, nationality, socio-economic status, loss of physical health and economic losses". The findings indicate a great need for assistance for mothers with poor resources. The effects of displacement or loss of home can be devastating and are often perceived as a loss of socio-economic status. The levels of satisfaction with the support network (essential for coping with stress and traumatic events) was found to decrease as the number of residential relocations increased.

Another study (Macksoud, 1992) found that children from low income groups had higher risks for exposure to traumatic events. One of the reasons might be that their families may "be less resourceful in protecting their children from war events" (:12). They may lack the financial resources which could allow them to secure safer places for them or the "war-wise" parental skills (diminishing outdoor activities for instance).

Marital relations

Other cases of forced displacement have shown that domestic violence has increased. The psychological pressure on husbands to assume their normal role often results in aggressive behaviour (UNHCR, 1991). There is no relevant data in the USJ/Laval survey on this particular issue, however the survey reports that the majority of couples experience serious problems in their marriages due to stress.


The USJ/Laval survey noted gender differences in the way displaced men and women were coping with their difficulties (Beaudoin and Kasparian, 1991). The results indicated that more displaced women tend to have feelings of helplessness than men. Their confinement in the house with little access to social support networks, and their isolation in a new environment added to the initial stress of home loss. More men were able to adapt to their new environment especially if they had found employment.

4.7.1 Poverty and female-headed households

4.7.2 Women subjected to violence and sexual abuse

Prostitution

Poverty had a direct effect on the number of women entering prostitution as a survival strategy during and after the war (Kheir-Badawi, 1987). A new phenomenon has been the emergence of prostitution of married women as a means of increasing income, often with the complicity of their husbands. However, these observations are based on few interviews and cannot be generalized in the absence of wider surveys.

A study conducted on youth delinquency (Y. Khouri, 1989) showed that some under age girls coming from poor backgrounds resorted to prostitution from an early age. Their problems were compounded by the absence of parental protection, the breakdown of all references due to the civil war, and the breakdown of family structures and authority (these girls often came from displaced families).

Domestic violence and rape

Data is not available on domestic violence or sexual abuse against women in Lebanon. Although these do not occur only in times of war, it is believed that there has been an increase of domestic violence and rape as a result of war. Conflict has increased some women's vulnerability to abuse, especially those who lived alone in the absence of their husbands. Their mobility and the physical risks they took in order to provide for their family increased their exposure.

There is also a correlation between the war and the level of domestic violence against women. Twenty years of war have normalized violence and many children have been "socialized" into it. This can affect women differently as they are usually the easy target of men's aggression. The demobilization of combatants is also another potential source of physical abuse against women. The adaptation period has been difficult for those "former heroes" who are possibly unskilled or uneducated, and therefore unprepared for post-war life. They often "acted out" their suffering on their wives and female relatives.

Traditions of honour and shame, guaranteed and reinforced by religious leaders, do not allow the unveiling of this reality. In Lebanon it is the victims who are stigmatized. In certain areas, rape is still punished by death of the victim. Crimes of honour have probably augmented in the absence of state control during the war.[35] Prior to the war, these crimes were increasingly punished. The two articles, 562 and 563,[36] which accord diminished responsibility and extenuating circumstances to the murderer, were less tolerated in practice. The realm of formal justice diminishes as the distance from the capital increases. Actions in the remote villages can easily escape government surveillance.

Considering the fear and the silence surrounding domestic violence and sexual abuse, the effective reintegration of women and girls is problematic. Women subjected to such abusive treatment are more vulnerable to disease, psychosomatic illness, anxiety attacks and depression (Dr Majdalani, in Al Raida, 1996). As long as the crimes are unreported, women cannot benefit from the support of social workers[37] nor can they receive any help.

Girls need to be helped in understanding the violence they were subjected to and, most importantly, relieved of the guilt they feel. It is essential that victims of such acts understand that they were not responsible for what happened to them in a society that stigmatizes women and girls whom they see as "impure".

4.7.3 Other groups

Youth

Youth in general was seriously affected by the war. Within this generation, those who belong to poor or displaced families had even more difficulties. Lebanese psychologists have argued that the youth was "tutored or socialized into violence" (in Georgi, n.d. :34). Another problem facing Lebanon is that a whole generation has lived and grown up in closed communities believing that their social world should be limited to their own group.

Lebanese youth has been exposed to violence and this poses the question of the long-term consequences on the future society of Lebanon. Several studies have indicated that children imitate the responses of the models with which they were presented (Georgi, n.d.; and McHan, 1985). One study on Lebanese children concluded that "the conceptual linkage between arousal conditions and modelled aggressive behaviour is so well established by the age of 5 years for children living in a conflict situation that the viewing of aggressive behaviour alone is a sufficient stimulus to elicit other aggressive behaviours" (McHan, 1985, :616).

The collapse of the State as a symbol of authority, paralleled with the loss of the father figure in many cases, contribute to the disorientation of the young Lebanese today. Field interviews with social workers have indicated that, especially among the displaced teenagers, many symptoms of depression and deep anxiety were manifested.

As noted, studies have indicated an increase in drug consumption which may be associated with the war and its "tragic" consequences for youth. The lack of future prospects is often a major factor in encouraging the abuse of toxic substance. The results of the small-scale survey indicated that the large majority of drug users were men, while another study noted an increase in the number of women addicts. Drug addiction was also found to be no longer restricted to certain socio-economic classes.

Combatants

The militias, excluding Hezbollah, were all dismantled in 1991 and a large number of militia-men were enrolled in the army, the police or the internal security forces. Drug abuse was found mostly among those for whom reintegration into civilian life proved most difficult (IREP, 1994). Approximately 3,000 women have received extensive military training during the war; some 300 women actively took part in combat over a long period. They were found mainly on the Christian side and had different social and educational backgrounds (Karame, n.d.). While their cause remained a national one they have not engaged in feminist activities. Data was unavailable on the reintegration of these combatants in the post-war period. One female unit of the Lebanese Forces[38] -- met during fieldwork -- has formed a religiously oriented NGO which focuses on civil education and defends the "Lebanese cause". As was noted, very few women participated in combat, but many were performing war-related tasks and provided essential support for militiamen.

The literature indicates that demobilized combatants may find it harder to reintegrate into society being used to having their needs met by their party. Peace for them would mean a reversal from a situation where they were completely taken in charge to a situation where they had to fend for themselves, often with little marketable skills. The women enrolled in the Lebanese Forces, however, had been encouraged (by their woman leader) to continue their education. This helped them during the transition period. Men were not so lucky and faced much more difficulties in civilian life.

Displaced women[39]

Some changes occurred in the division of labour of some displaced families. The activities related to health, education, and general care of children are still the responsibility of the mother; administrative duties are the father's domain. This reflects the general tendency within the society. However, in some households women are in charge of daily shopping for food and other necessities. There is also a slight increase in the percentage of women taking charge of food and household provision compared to the pre-displacement period, 43.4 per cent before and 46.6 per cent after displacement. In the administrative duties, the man is usually in charge (59 per cent); but in the poorest category, the role of the father changes (26 per cent), and the mother's role increases in terms of activity levels from 18 per cent to 33 per cent.

Education has also been affected by displacement: the school enrolment rates for the displaced is lower than the rate for the resident population. Displacement has affected women differently although not always in a negative way, in the intermediate and secondary levels, the enrolment rate of boys and girls in the 11-14 and 15-17 age group shows that for both sexes there was a higher degree of schooling compared to the pre-displacement period. The enrolment rates for girls were higher after displacement (59.2 per cent prior to displacement and 64.9 per cent after), whereas the rates for boys were lower following displacement (70.3 per cent and 64.9 per cent respectively). This is mainly due to the larger number of boys sent to work in order to contribute to family income.

The illiteracy rate is higher among the displaced population. In the population aged 10 years and over, the illiteracy rate is 18.98 per cent as opposed to 15.4 per cent in the general population; 82 per cent of the displaced attending school have never received any financial aid; 18.2 per cent of university students have received some financial contribution as a grant or an interest-free loan.

The study revealed that, among the displaced population, men are much more likely to be disabled than women. Conversely, women suffer more from chronic diseases. The numbers of disabled people in the displaced population is twice the number in the capital's population; 54.8 per cent of the displaced population receives no medical aid or insurance. The distribution of the financial aid varies according to the socio-professional category. For instance, independent workers such as agricultural workers or artisans, receive no help at all. The USJ and Laval study showed that the number of disabled is 57,000 out of which 14,200 were injured during the war. No figures are available concerning the number of disabled women in the whole population, but women are usually primary-care givers for disabled family members and should receive assistance.

According to NGOs and to governmental agencies, the needs of the displaced are comparable to those of the poor in general. Following displacement, their living conditions have deteriorated more than that of the general population. The survey has identified their needs -- as expressed by social workers -- to be the following: for 75 per cent of the displaced, the most urgent needs are basic food and daily requirements, proper housing, hospitalization and medical aid, and transport. Other problematic areas are linked to unemployment, psycho-social problems in the family, and disrupted education. The lack of access to medical services, housing, vocational rehabilitation, and educational services is also very important. Furthermore, integration was problematic for many displaced -- coming from rural areas -- who had to adapt to an urban setting.

Housing is the most obvious problem facing the displaced. In the absence of a policy to settle them, people had to fend for themselves by any possible means. One out of ten households lives in very precarious conditions, sometimes in a single room or in shelters. This proportion would have been much higher had the Palestinian population been included in the survey (Beaudoin and Kasparian, 1991). Almost half the displaced households (47 per cent) are dependent on a relative, a political party or an association. None of them are owners or tenants as opposed to 6 per cent before the war. The number of households having no access to running water is 4 times higher than prior to the war (12 per cent).

Access to services has been affected also; a small minority of people have access to a medical centre, half of them have easy access to schools. In general, the living conditions of the displaced population are inferior to those of the rest of the population. Three-quarters of the displaced population belongs to the low socio-economic group, their standard of living is clearly inferior to that of the resident population which has also suffered from the deterioration of the economy and the soaring inflation.

>> CHAPTER 5